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Petite lecture intéressante, je pense que certain connaisse déjà. Mais il est souvent évoqué le comportement et l'inexpérience des Troop Carrier lors du D-DAY. Idées reçue véhiculés en partie par Ambrose dans l'un de ses livres sur les para et qui sont souvent maintenant comme l'on dit " la vérité" .
Randolph J. Hils
3080 Whirlaway Trail
Tallahassee, FL 32309
May 23, 2004
Rod Paschall
Editor, Military History Quarterly
741 Miller Drive SE
Suite D-2
Leesburg, VA 20175
RE: Military History Quarterly, Summer 2004 issue, Screaming Eagles in Normandy by John M. Taylor
Dear Editor,
Screaming Eagles in Normandy article, pages 28-29 Taylor writes;
"If the 101st was an elite unit, the Troop Carrier Command (TCC) was not. The air corps best pilots opted for fighters and bombers; the transports got what was left. Moreover, TCC pilots had not been trained in night flying or in formation flying in bad weather. As Stephen Ambrose noted, "The possibility of a mid-air collision was on every pilots mind." During the first hours of D-Day, when the great armada of C-47s encountered both clouds and groundfire, formation flying went by the board and many paratroopers were dropped wherever it seemed most convenient."
MHQ states that all of their articles are rigorously fact checked. References for a particular article may be obtained by sending a self-addressed stamped envelope to the editorial offices. I would send for the references on John Taylor's article but they are obviously outdated and incorrect. Ambrose's writings regarding the Troop Carrier pilots have long been discredited by serious historians of the Airborne and Troop Carrier.
Mr. Taylor makes a number of false statements in his article;
"The air corps best pilots opted for fighters and bombers; the transports got what was left. Moreover, TCC pilots had not been trained in night flying or in formation flying in bad weather"
There is a plethora of official records from the USAAF Flight Schools, Troop Carrier Groups as well as individual training records of these pilots that shows this statement to be patently untrue. It is an enduring myth promoted over the past 60 years by the extremely poor research conducted by some of the most noted historians of out time. Detailed training and mission records on each Troop Carrier Group that participated in OPERATION NEPTUNE, June 6, 1944 are on available micro-film files at the USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
My own in-depth research as well as that of Stephen Ambrose for his book, Wild Blue, indicates that pilots were chosen for a particular aircraft type based largely on the needs of the service. Records from Advanced Twin Engine schools show that entire classes or blocks of classes were assigned based upon the needs of the USAAF. Hot pilots, the best, did not generally show their abilities in type until Transition Training to a particular type or beyond. At the point of Transition Training assignments pilots generally had about 200 hours of flight time which included having to demonstrate basic competency in formation flying, night flying and weather. I would also direct you and the author to the seven-volume history of the USAAF, The Army Air Forces in WWII edited by Craven and Cate which provides detailed information on pilot training and selection in the volume, Men and Planes.
"As Stephen Ambrose noted, "The possibility of a mid-air collision was on every pilots mind."
Of interest are Ambrose's conclusions of what "was on every pilots mind." On June 2, 2000 Ambrose called troop carrier historian Lew Johnston and left a lengthy telephone message in which he admitted that he had not interviewed a single troop carrier pilot for his book, (copy in my files). The book does contain a couple of collected oral recollections from TC personnel. With that in mind, how could Ambrose know what "most" pilots were thinking?
Troop Carrier units had a distinct advantage over other types of units in leadership and experience there were a cadre of former airline captains that were sprinkled throughout the troop carrier training and combat commands. It was a natural progression for the Army Air Force Reserve pilots employed by the airlines to be called on to help form, train and lead in troop carrier in that they had long experience flying the DC-3, the civilian version of the C-47. Troop Carrier units benefited from the experience they bought with them in the form of advanced weather flying, something the AAF did not put into standard practice until mid 1943. The airline captains were arguably the best and most experienced twin engine pilots in the country when the war began. In a 1995 letter, Col Frank X. Krebs, CO, 440th Troop Carrier Group wrote of the value of these men in his command.
A troop carrier pilot's specialized training, low level "contour" combat flying, towing gliders, and dropping airborne warriors set them apart from the Air Transport Command who operated the same type aircraft but whose mission was primarily freight and passenger transport outside the combat zone. The distinctive training in the airborne arts of accurately dropping paratroopers, supplies, towing gliders by twos and retrieving them in flight took months of intensive training for pilots and crews.
"During the first hours of D-Day, when the great armada of C-47s encountered both clouds and groundfire, formation flying went by the board and many paratroopers were dropped wherever it seemed most convenient."
Some heretofore and unstudied aeronautical problems of the mission are the weights and balance of the aircraft, weather and the effect of control on the perception of speed and opening shock. The first and foremost mission consideration of an Airlift Planner is weights and balance, that is the loading related to the center of gravity of the plane around which the flight control is designed. An aircraft that is miss-loaded or overloaded is out of its weights and balance. Violation of performance design by overloading remains today a common cause of air crashes.
A random sampling of pilot records for Normandy indicated the troop carrier planes were overloaded from 1,000 to 4,000 pounds! The overloads seriously affected pilot control of the aircraft. The primary reason for upping the jump speed from 90 miles per hour to 110 miles per hour was to adjust for the anticipated excess loads of parachute skids and parapacks of equipment not normally carried on practice jumps. Further the paratroopers themselves had never been so heavily loaded. Even at 110 miles per hour some of the planes were at stall speed and some did stall in flight.
Troop Carrier formations flew with each flight stacked higher than the preceding flight so that turbulence would be reduced on both the following aircraft and their parachutists. Unfortunately the cloud cover at Normandy was recorded as low as 300 feet to a high of 2500 feet. Formations, some recording the cloud cover as low as 500 feet flattened out and turbulence seriously affected both the following aircraft as well as the troopers that
jumped from them.
The cloud cover extended as much as fifteen miles inland on a peninsula about twenty miles wide. Some pilots with sometimes just minutes to identify a DZ often slowed suddenly, some also had to loose altitude as the clouds were encountered on the descent leg from 1500 feet. Many paratroopers swear that by the sound of the engines the pilots speeded up instead of slowing down and there is no doubt opening shock tore away the equipment of some. A couple of different control problems I believe contributed significantly to those perceptions.
First, according to troop carrier pilot, Lewis Johnson, a very effective way to, "slow down and loose altitude in a C-47 is to pull the throttles back, and at the same time set the engine revolutions higher. The forward motion of the airplane makes the propellers windmill faster without power being applied, which acts as an airbrake to reduce forward speed. To the uninitiated, this sounds like power being applied."
Secondly, pilots who had to slow suddenly behind other aircraft were in danger of over running the leaders ahead as they slowed for the jump. The sudden drop in airspeed brought them to the point of stalling. As the troopers exited the aircraft pilots had to apply power to keep from stalling and troopers jumped into full prop blast to the sound of speeding engines experiencing terrific opening shock yet the aircraft were only going 110 miles per hour.
Third, normally in practice jumps pilots feathered the left prop to reduce to a minimum prop blast and resulting opening shock. Even under the best circumstances at Normandy given the extreme loading, feathering the prop wasn't an option. Close to stall speed the effect of feathering the prop would be the same as losing an engine. Loaded as these planes were losing an engine would cause them to immediately drop like a rock. Some severely overloaded planes would even require climb power to effect the tail high position required for troopers to clear the aircraft at 110 miles per hour. Again engines are straining as power is applied to maintain the weight of the moment.
Finally, it is ludicrous to suppose that any pilot could maintain a formation with 100 feet or less between wingtips, at night through clouds for much distance. Pilots had practiced separation procedures if weather was to be encountered. Groups would spread to prearranged headings and reform with the aid of the ADF devices on board. Unfortunately SHAEF neglected to include standard orders for weather for this mission in Field Order # 1 for NEPTUNE and that negligence set the stage for all that was to follow.
On the 60th Anniversary of D-Day it would have been refreshing to read a well-researched article on the NEPTUNE operation, unfortunately this article was not. It was another slap in the face to the training, expertise and service of the Troop Carrier veterans of Normandy and their comrades who were among the first casualties of the invasion. These pilots fought the odds to save a poorly planned mission. John M. Taylor, MHQ and Primedia Group owe an apology to these veterans who earned and were awarded the Distinguished (Presidential) Unit Citation for this mission.
I ask that you please pass my comments along to author John M. Taylor. For further research, discussion and supporting documentation please visit the links page at my web site, http://www.440thtroopcarriergroup.org
Sincerely,
Randy Hils
Recording Historian, 440th Troop Carrier Group
Cc: Dean Nelson, Chairman, Primedia Group
eric
Petite lecture intéressante, je pense que certain connaisse déjà. Mais il est souvent évoqué le comportement et l'inexpérience des Troop Carrier lors du D-DAY. Idées reçue véhiculés en partie par Ambrose dans l'un de ses livres sur les para et qui sont souvent maintenant comme l'on dit " la vérité" .
Randolph J. Hils
3080 Whirlaway Trail
Tallahassee, FL 32309
May 23, 2004
Rod Paschall
Editor, Military History Quarterly
741 Miller Drive SE
Suite D-2
Leesburg, VA 20175
RE: Military History Quarterly, Summer 2004 issue, Screaming Eagles in Normandy by John M. Taylor
Dear Editor,
Screaming Eagles in Normandy article, pages 28-29 Taylor writes;
"If the 101st was an elite unit, the Troop Carrier Command (TCC) was not. The air corps best pilots opted for fighters and bombers; the transports got what was left. Moreover, TCC pilots had not been trained in night flying or in formation flying in bad weather. As Stephen Ambrose noted, "The possibility of a mid-air collision was on every pilots mind." During the first hours of D-Day, when the great armada of C-47s encountered both clouds and groundfire, formation flying went by the board and many paratroopers were dropped wherever it seemed most convenient."
MHQ states that all of their articles are rigorously fact checked. References for a particular article may be obtained by sending a self-addressed stamped envelope to the editorial offices. I would send for the references on John Taylor's article but they are obviously outdated and incorrect. Ambrose's writings regarding the Troop Carrier pilots have long been discredited by serious historians of the Airborne and Troop Carrier.
Mr. Taylor makes a number of false statements in his article;
"The air corps best pilots opted for fighters and bombers; the transports got what was left. Moreover, TCC pilots had not been trained in night flying or in formation flying in bad weather"
There is a plethora of official records from the USAAF Flight Schools, Troop Carrier Groups as well as individual training records of these pilots that shows this statement to be patently untrue. It is an enduring myth promoted over the past 60 years by the extremely poor research conducted by some of the most noted historians of out time. Detailed training and mission records on each Troop Carrier Group that participated in OPERATION NEPTUNE, June 6, 1944 are on available micro-film files at the USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
My own in-depth research as well as that of Stephen Ambrose for his book, Wild Blue, indicates that pilots were chosen for a particular aircraft type based largely on the needs of the service. Records from Advanced Twin Engine schools show that entire classes or blocks of classes were assigned based upon the needs of the USAAF. Hot pilots, the best, did not generally show their abilities in type until Transition Training to a particular type or beyond. At the point of Transition Training assignments pilots generally had about 200 hours of flight time which included having to demonstrate basic competency in formation flying, night flying and weather. I would also direct you and the author to the seven-volume history of the USAAF, The Army Air Forces in WWII edited by Craven and Cate which provides detailed information on pilot training and selection in the volume, Men and Planes.
"As Stephen Ambrose noted, "The possibility of a mid-air collision was on every pilots mind."
Of interest are Ambrose's conclusions of what "was on every pilots mind." On June 2, 2000 Ambrose called troop carrier historian Lew Johnston and left a lengthy telephone message in which he admitted that he had not interviewed a single troop carrier pilot for his book, (copy in my files). The book does contain a couple of collected oral recollections from TC personnel. With that in mind, how could Ambrose know what "most" pilots were thinking?
Troop Carrier units had a distinct advantage over other types of units in leadership and experience there were a cadre of former airline captains that were sprinkled throughout the troop carrier training and combat commands. It was a natural progression for the Army Air Force Reserve pilots employed by the airlines to be called on to help form, train and lead in troop carrier in that they had long experience flying the DC-3, the civilian version of the C-47. Troop Carrier units benefited from the experience they bought with them in the form of advanced weather flying, something the AAF did not put into standard practice until mid 1943. The airline captains were arguably the best and most experienced twin engine pilots in the country when the war began. In a 1995 letter, Col Frank X. Krebs, CO, 440th Troop Carrier Group wrote of the value of these men in his command.
A troop carrier pilot's specialized training, low level "contour" combat flying, towing gliders, and dropping airborne warriors set them apart from the Air Transport Command who operated the same type aircraft but whose mission was primarily freight and passenger transport outside the combat zone. The distinctive training in the airborne arts of accurately dropping paratroopers, supplies, towing gliders by twos and retrieving them in flight took months of intensive training for pilots and crews.
"During the first hours of D-Day, when the great armada of C-47s encountered both clouds and groundfire, formation flying went by the board and many paratroopers were dropped wherever it seemed most convenient."
Some heretofore and unstudied aeronautical problems of the mission are the weights and balance of the aircraft, weather and the effect of control on the perception of speed and opening shock. The first and foremost mission consideration of an Airlift Planner is weights and balance, that is the loading related to the center of gravity of the plane around which the flight control is designed. An aircraft that is miss-loaded or overloaded is out of its weights and balance. Violation of performance design by overloading remains today a common cause of air crashes.
A random sampling of pilot records for Normandy indicated the troop carrier planes were overloaded from 1,000 to 4,000 pounds! The overloads seriously affected pilot control of the aircraft. The primary reason for upping the jump speed from 90 miles per hour to 110 miles per hour was to adjust for the anticipated excess loads of parachute skids and parapacks of equipment not normally carried on practice jumps. Further the paratroopers themselves had never been so heavily loaded. Even at 110 miles per hour some of the planes were at stall speed and some did stall in flight.
Troop Carrier formations flew with each flight stacked higher than the preceding flight so that turbulence would be reduced on both the following aircraft and their parachutists. Unfortunately the cloud cover at Normandy was recorded as low as 300 feet to a high of 2500 feet. Formations, some recording the cloud cover as low as 500 feet flattened out and turbulence seriously affected both the following aircraft as well as the troopers that
jumped from them.
The cloud cover extended as much as fifteen miles inland on a peninsula about twenty miles wide. Some pilots with sometimes just minutes to identify a DZ often slowed suddenly, some also had to loose altitude as the clouds were encountered on the descent leg from 1500 feet. Many paratroopers swear that by the sound of the engines the pilots speeded up instead of slowing down and there is no doubt opening shock tore away the equipment of some. A couple of different control problems I believe contributed significantly to those perceptions.
First, according to troop carrier pilot, Lewis Johnson, a very effective way to, "slow down and loose altitude in a C-47 is to pull the throttles back, and at the same time set the engine revolutions higher. The forward motion of the airplane makes the propellers windmill faster without power being applied, which acts as an airbrake to reduce forward speed. To the uninitiated, this sounds like power being applied."
Secondly, pilots who had to slow suddenly behind other aircraft were in danger of over running the leaders ahead as they slowed for the jump. The sudden drop in airspeed brought them to the point of stalling. As the troopers exited the aircraft pilots had to apply power to keep from stalling and troopers jumped into full prop blast to the sound of speeding engines experiencing terrific opening shock yet the aircraft were only going 110 miles per hour.
Third, normally in practice jumps pilots feathered the left prop to reduce to a minimum prop blast and resulting opening shock. Even under the best circumstances at Normandy given the extreme loading, feathering the prop wasn't an option. Close to stall speed the effect of feathering the prop would be the same as losing an engine. Loaded as these planes were losing an engine would cause them to immediately drop like a rock. Some severely overloaded planes would even require climb power to effect the tail high position required for troopers to clear the aircraft at 110 miles per hour. Again engines are straining as power is applied to maintain the weight of the moment.
Finally, it is ludicrous to suppose that any pilot could maintain a formation with 100 feet or less between wingtips, at night through clouds for much distance. Pilots had practiced separation procedures if weather was to be encountered. Groups would spread to prearranged headings and reform with the aid of the ADF devices on board. Unfortunately SHAEF neglected to include standard orders for weather for this mission in Field Order # 1 for NEPTUNE and that negligence set the stage for all that was to follow.
On the 60th Anniversary of D-Day it would have been refreshing to read a well-researched article on the NEPTUNE operation, unfortunately this article was not. It was another slap in the face to the training, expertise and service of the Troop Carrier veterans of Normandy and their comrades who were among the first casualties of the invasion. These pilots fought the odds to save a poorly planned mission. John M. Taylor, MHQ and Primedia Group owe an apology to these veterans who earned and were awarded the Distinguished (Presidential) Unit Citation for this mission.
I ask that you please pass my comments along to author John M. Taylor. For further research, discussion and supporting documentation please visit the links page at my web site, http://www.440thtroopcarriergroup.org
Sincerely,
Randy Hils
Recording Historian, 440th Troop Carrier Group
Cc: Dean Nelson, Chairman, Primedia Group
eric
